New products, services, and ideas are often evaluated more favorably than similar but older ones. Although several explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed, we identify an overlooked asymmetry in information about new and old items that emerges when people seek positive experiences and learn about the qualities of (noisy) alternatives by experiencing them. The reason for the asymmetry is that people avoid rechoosing alternatives that previously led to poor outcomes; hence, additional feedback on their qualities is precluded. Negative quality estimates, even when caused by noise, thus tend to persist. This negative bias takes time to develop, and affects old alternatives more strongly than similar but newer alternatives. We analyze a simple learning model and demonstrate the process by which people would tend to evaluate a new alternative more positively than an older alternative with the same payoff distribution. The results from two experimental studies (Ns = 769 and 805) support the predictions of our model.
Research Article
Why do people like new items, practices, gadgets, and ideas? Prior work has advanced two main classes of answers to this question. According to the first category of explanations, people like new things because they solve some problems that the old ones could not address (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Schumpeter, 1939) , or because they are a better fit for changing tastes (Lieberson, 2000; Peterson & Berger, 1975) . Explanations in the second category focus on how things catch on and have generally relied on imitation mechanisms to explain how new artists, albums, restaurants, or technological gadgets become popular while older items fall out of favor (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 1995; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) .
In this article, we propose an additional factor that can contribute to the evaluative advantage of novel alternatives. Our proposal builds on the adaptive-sampling model of attitude formation (Denrell, 2005; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004 ; see also Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978, and March, 1996) and focuses on situations in which people form attitudes from their own experiences with the alternatives, which have uncertain, noisy, payoffs. The crucial assumption is that people tend to resample alternatives that have led to positive experiences and to avoid alternatives that have led to negative experiences. This avoidance behavior precludes further feedback on the qualities of alternatives that have led to poor payoffs. Negative evaluations of those alternatives thus tend to persist. This leads people to frequently underestimate the positive qualities of the experienced alternatives (Denrell, 2005; Fazio et al., 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010; Le Mens & Denrell, 2011; Smith & Collins, 2009 ).
Our explanation for the evaluative advantage of novel alternatives relies on the fact that this underestimation tendency is an emergent phenomenon that results from the sequential nature of the sampling process. In fact, the phenomenon becomes more pronounced the longer the experience with the original alternatives. When a new alternative becomes available, it has not yet been subject to adaptive sampling. Thus, the systematic underestimation of its quality has not emerged yet. The new alternative will tend to be evaluated more positively than existing alternatives of the same quality, even if information about the new alternative is not processed more positively than information about the existing alternatives. The mechanism we propose is relevant to understanding human judgment even if information about new and existing alternatives is processed differently, because it focuses on a different level of analysis: the information on which cognitive processes operate. Thus, our theory does not contradict existing explanations for the evaluative advantage of novel alternatives; rather, it offers a complementary mechanism that can play a role in naturally occurring environments.
The Quality-Estimation Model: Formal Analysis
We consider a task environment in which an individual faces a bandit problem (Sutton & Barto, 1998) . In each period, the individual decides whether to select an alternative (alt.) with an unknown (and noisy) payoff distribution (Alt. 1) or an alternative with a known payoff distribution (Alt. 2). The total payoff is the sum of the payoffs obtained in all the periods. The individual seeks to obtain positive payoffs and learns by doing, updating quality estimates for the unknown alternative (Alt. 1) on the basis of sampled payoffs of this alternative. We assume that the individual is more likely to resample Alt. 1 if it has led to positive outcomes than if it has led to poor outcomes. This is the adaptive-sampling assumption (Denrell, 2005; Fazio et al., 2004) . Adaptive sampling is a reasonable choice heuristic when the individual tries to maximize the sum of his or her payoffs (Denrell, 2005; Le Mens & Denrell, 2011; Sutton & Barto, 1998) . Moreover, it is consistent with existing experimental evidence (Erev & Barron, 2005; Hull, 1930; Thorndike, 1927 ; for a review, see Erev & Roth, 2014) .
Where our setting differs from the standard bandit problem is that, after some time-at period τ-a new alternative, Alt. N (as in "new"), becomes available. We focus on how the quality estimates for Alt. N compare with the quality estimates for Alt. 1.
Model
We keep the model simple in order to derive formal results and illustrate the main intuition. Unless otherwise noted, we denote random variables by capital letters and their instantiations by corresponding lowercase letters.
Payoff distributions. The payoff distributions are continuous with positive variance. Alt. 1 and Alt. N have the same payoff distribution. Alt. 2 has an arbitrary payoff distribution. Although we assume continuity for simplicity, our proofs can easily be adapted to cases in which the payoff distributions are discrete.
Initial quality estimates. The quality estimate for Alt. k at the beginning of period t is denoted by ˆ. , Q k t The initial quality estimates of Alt. 1 and Alt. N are random draws from their payoff distributions (and therefore unbiased). The quality estimate for Alt. 2 is a deterministic function of its known payoff distribution. This estimate does not change because the payoff distribution of this alternative is known.
Estimate updating. In all periods, ˆ, Q t 1 is equal to the last observed payoff of Alt. 1, or to its initial quality estimate if this alternative has not yet been chosen. Likewise, ˆ, Q t N is equal to the last observed payoff of Alt. N, or to its initial quality estimate if this alternative has not yet been chosen. Although we make this assumption for analytic convenience, recent experimental evidence on sequential choice between uncertain alternatives has shown that choices are well predicted by a model that focuses only on the most recent outcome (Avrahami & Kareev, 2011; Kareev, Avrahami, & Fiedler, 2014) .
Sampling rule. Let pS 1 denote the likelihood that the individual samples Alt. 1 in period t. We implement the adaptive-sampling assumption by assuming that pS 1 increases with ˆ. , q t 1
Main formal result
The assumptions about sampling and estimate updating imply that Alt. 1 is likely to be believed inferior to Alt. N when Alt. N becomes available. That is, the probability that Alt. N is believed to be better than Alt. 1 is higher than the probability that it is believed to be worse than Alt. 1. This is formalized in the following theorem (for the proof, see Proof of Theorem 1 in the Supplemental Material available online):
This result is explained by the emergence of a systematic underestimation tendency for Alt. 1 (see Lemma 2 in the proof presented in the Supplemental Material; see also Denrell, 2005 , for a different formulation). This underestimation tendency, together with the assumption that the initial estimate for Alt. N is unbiased, implies an evaluative advantage for Alt. N.
Discussion
Theorem 1 holds for almost any payoff distribution and any sampling rule according to which the probability of sampling increases with quality estimates. In order to prove this result, we assumed that quality estimates were equal to the last observed payoff (without this assumption, the proof becomes intractable). In the next section, we use computer simulations to show that our result continues to hold even if this assumption is relaxed and quality estimates are weighted averages of observed payoffs.
The Quality-Estimation Model: Computer Simulations
Model
The task environment for our simulations was a version of the bandit setting described in the previous section. Initially, there are two alternatives: Alt. 1 and Alt 2. In period τ, a third, novel alternative (Alt. N) is introduced. Alt. N has the same payoff distribution as Alt. 1.
The payoff distributions of Alt. 1 and Alt. N are uniform between 0 and 130. Alt. 2 is less risky, with a uniform payoff distribution between 62 and 68. Choice between Alt. 1 and Alt 2 proceeds for 10 periods; the new alternative is introduced and becomes available for the last, 11th, period. Our focus is on the comparison between the quality estimates for the two alternatives with the same payoff distribution but different times of entry: Alt. 1 and Alt. N. We focus on estimates for alternatives with high variability because the underestimation tendency for old alternatives tends to be stronger when payoffs are more variable (see Denrell, 2005; March, 1996) .
We assume that the sampling rule is a logistic choice rule and that the individual updates quality estimates using the delta rule (Busemeyer & Myung, 1992) . Prior research has shown that this simple model provides a good fit to experimental data on sequential choice under uncertainty (Denrell, 2005) .
Estimate updating. The updated quality estimate follows the delta rule: It is a weighted average of the past estimate and the last observation. When the individual chooses Alt. k, the quality estimate for that alternative is updated as follows: ˆ, , ,
, where q k,t is the sampled payoff of Alt. k in period t, and b is the weight of the last observation (0 < b ≤ 1). When an alternative is not sampled, its quality estimate does not change. Results: sensitivity to model parameters
In our simulations, Alt. N had a clear evaluative advantage compared with Alt. 1, both at the time that Alt. N was introduced (at the beginning of the last period, τ = 11) and after the last period (see Table 1 ). It is worth noting that it is not necessary that Alt. N be introduced many periods after Alt. 1 for it to have an evaluative advantage. Figure 1 illustrates what happened when Alt. N was introduced shortly after Alt. 1 (τ = 3). Alt. N's evaluative advantage was not as strong in this case as when Alt. N was introduced much later than Alt. 1. This is because the underestimation tendency for Alt. 1 tends to increase over time, and thus the later Alt. N's time of entry, the stronger its evaluative advantage. Figure 1 also shows that Alt. N's evaluative advantage diminished with time. This is not surprising, because Alt. N is also subject to adaptive sampling and to the consequent underestimation tendency. At the time that Alt. N was introduced, its evaluative advantage tended to be stronger when the weight of new evidence was high than when it was low (i.e., when b was close to 1). It was also stronger when the sensitivity of the sampling rule to quality estimates was higher (i.e., when the value of s was higher). This is because the underestimation tendency for Alt. 1 implied by adaptive sampling becomes stronger as b and s increase. At the same time, as the values of b and s increase, the speed of the decline in the evaluative advantage of Alt. N also increases (see Fig. 1 ). The reason is that when b and s are high, the emergent underestimation of Alt. N's quality also takes place. When s is high, Alt. N is almost always chosen at the time it is introduced because it is evaluated more positively than Alt. 1 and the choice rule is sensitive to differences in evaluations. If the sampled outcome is poor, then Alt. N is immediately avoided. In other words, when s is high, most of the learning is about Alt. N, and adaptive sampling quickly leads to a tendency to underestimate the quality of Alt. N as well. After enough time has elapsed since the entry of Alt. N, its evaluative advantage is eliminated.
Discussion
Adaptive sampling yields an evaluative advantage for a new alternative over an alternative that has the same payoff distribution but has been available longer. Ancillary analyses showed that similar results hold if there are more alternatives. Our simulations relied on a number of modeling assumptions regarding prior estimates, estimate updating, and sampling behavior. We verified the realism of these assumptions by running a behavioral experiment.
Experiment 1
Participants faced the same task environment as in the first set of simulations described in the previous section. They were encouraged to maximize the total number of points they obtained in the experiment-which determined their .6
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Results of 50,000 computer simulations of the quality-estimation model: probability that Alternative N (Alt. N) is evaluated more favorably than Alternative 1 ( )
as a function of parameters b, s, and time (i.e., period). In these simulations, there were 11 periods, and Alt. N was introduced at the beginning of Period 3 (τ = 3).
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Design
Participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this experiment online. They received a fixed minimal payment plus a bonus based on the number of points they earned. There were 11 periods in the task, and Alt. N became available at the beginning of the last period. The payoff distribution of Alt. N was the same as that of Alt. 1, namely, a uniform distribution between 0 and 130. The payoff distribution for Alt. 2 was uniform between 62 and 68.
The only information participants knew about the payoff distributions was that they would not change over time (as implied by the cover story-see Methodological Details in the Supplemental Material available online). So that participants would have at least some unbiased prior information about all the alternatives, they were provided with a "free" observation of one random draw of each alternative just before it was introduced: The participants saw one random draw of Alt. 1 and one random draw of Alt. 2 before Period 1 and one random draw of Alt. N between Period 10 and Period 11.
At the end of the study, participants were asked what payoff they would expect if they chose each alternative one more time.
Number of participants
On the basis of pretests, we predicted that the parameter values of the learning model would be around 0.02 for s and .75 for b. Simulations of our model suggested that with these parameters, the proportions of participants who would evaluate Alt. N more positively than Alt. 1 would be about .55. Calculations suggested that a sample size of at least 545 participants would be required for a 99% confidence interval (CI) centered on .55 not to include .50 (which corresponded to the null hypothesis). The data were collected over several online sessions; we stopped at the end of the session in which that sample size was achieved. Our final sample included 769 participants, which provided power of .87 to observe the hypothesized effect (with the p value set at .05, one-tailed).
Results
We focus on the comparison between the quality estimates for the two alternatives with the same payoff distribution but different times of entry: Alt. 1 and Alt. N. Let est 1 and est N denote the subjective quality estimates for Alt. 1 and Alt. N, respectively, at the end of the experiment. On the basis of the analyses reported in the previous sections, we predicted that participants would be more likely to regard Alt. N as superior to Alt. 1 than to regard it as inferior to Alt. 1:
Information-sampling behavior. To assess the extent to which participants engaged in adaptive sampling, we estimated the parameters of the model. If s and b were both greater than 0, participants could be regarded as behaving according to the adaptive-sampling assumption.
To estimate s and b, we implemented maximum likelihood estimations, using the unconstrained optimization routine fminsearch in MATLAB R2013a (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). Standard errors were estimated using the BHHH estimator (see Berndt, Hall, Hall, & Hausman, 1974, and Greene, 2003, p. 481) . The best-fitting value for s was 0.021, 95% CI = [0.019, 0.022], and the best-fitting value for b was .74, 95% CI = [.68, .80]. These positive estimates indicate that participants engaged in adaptive sampling, as expected. The high value for b suggests that they were subject to a strong recency effect, which is in line with existing empirical evidence (Avrahami & Kareev, 2011) .
The fact that participants' behavior could be explained by the adaptive-sampling model implied that there would be an information asymmetry in favor of the new alternative. Running 100,000 simulations of the model with the estimated parameters (s = 0.021 and b = .74) indicated that 54% of the participants would have a quality estimate higher for Alt. N than for Alt. 1.
Final quality estimate implied by the information sampled by the participants. To verify our prediction, we computed what would have been the participants' quality estimates had they integrated the information they actually sampled according to the delta rule (see the section on the computer simulations). We used the estimated parameter value of b (i.e., .74). ˆ, Q F 1 and ˆ, Q F N denote the final quality estimates implied by this estimate-updating model. These estimates are recencyweighted averages of the payoffs actually obtained by the participants.
As predicted, the implied quality estimate for Alt. N was higher than the implied quality estimate for Alt. 1 in more than half of the cases. The proportion of participants for whom ˆ, Q F N was greater thanˆ, Q F 1 was .571, 95% CI = [.536, .605]. (The confidence intervals on proportions were constructed using beta (α+1, β+1) distributions, where α is the number of participants for whom the focal inequality holds strictly and β is the number of participants for whom the opposite inequality holds strictly.) Furthermore, the implied quality estimate for Alt. 1 was lower than its true mean more frequently than the quality estimate for Alt. N: ˆ, Q F 1 was below 65 (the true mean payoff) in .655 of the cases (95% CI = [.621, .688]), whereas ˆ, Q F N was below 65 in .535 of the cases (95% CI = [.499, .570]). Ancillary analyses showed that there was also an asymmetry in favor of Alt. N if the quality estimate for each alternative was assumed to be equal to the last observed payoff (which is equivalent to assuming b = 1) and if it was assumed to be equal to the unweighted average of past observed payoffs (see Additional Analyses in the Supplemental Material available online).
Participants' subjective final quality estimates. The information asymmetry in favor of Alt. N should have translated into an evaluative advantage for this alternative as revealed by participants' expressed quality estimates (the value they expected to get with one additional draw). These subjective estimates, denoted by est 1 and est N , favored Alt. N: Among the 735 participants with different estimates for the two alternatives, the proportion of participants with est N greater than est 1 was .533, 95% CI = [.497, .569 ]. In addition, Alt. 1 tended to be underestimated. The proportion of participants for whom est 1 was less than 65 (the true common mean) was .576, 95% CI = [.540, .611]. Alt. N was also subject to a tendency for underestimation, but this tendency was (unsurprisingly) much weaker than that for Alt. 1. The proportion of participants for whom est N was less than 65 was .510, 95% CI = [.474, .546].
Individual differences. Participants' choices and estimate updating conformed to varying degrees to the assumptions of our model. We next estimated the model parameters s and b individually for each participant. Not surprisingly, the evaluative advantage in favor of Alt. N was stronger for those participants who engaged more clearly in adaptive sampling. For example, among the participants with s higher than the median (Mdn = 0.027), the proportion of participants for whom est N was greater than est 1 was .580, 95% CI = [.528, .629]. The corresponding proportion was .489, 95% CI = [.439, .540], for those participants for whom s was lower than the median.
Discussion
Participants experienced samples of information about Alt. N that were generally more positive than the most recent samples of information they had experienced with the comparison alternative that had been available since the first period. They also came to evaluate Alt. N more positively than the comparison alternative. The asymmetry in subjective estimates (est 1 and est N ) was not as strong as the asymmetry in estimates implied by the sampled information (ˆ, Q F 1 and ˆ, Q F N ). Nevertheless, the existence of the asymmetry in subjective estimates is important, because it demonstrates that people do not fully correct for the information bias induced by their own sampling behavior.
Our argument is based on an asymmetry in sampled information. One may wonder what would happen if participants observed forgone payoffs in each period. In that case, the available samples of information for the alternatives would be unbiased, regardless of the choices of the participants. Thus, if our sampling-based argument is correct, the evaluative advantage of Alt. N should disappear in this setting. To find out if it does, we ran a second experiment. 1
Experiment 2

Design
The design for our second experiment was the same as for Experiment 1, with just one difference: In every period, the participant saw not only the payoff of the chosen alternative but also the payoffs that would have been received had the other alternative been selected (before the introduction of Alt. N) or had either of the other alternatives been selected (after the introduction of Alt. N). Eight hundred five participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the experiment.
Results
Among the 798 participants with different estimates for the two alternatives, the proportion of participants for whom est N was greater than est 1 was .515, 95% CI = [.480, .550]. As predicted, this proportion was lower than in Experiment 1, in which sampling asymmetries emerged. The difference between these proportions in the two experiments was necessarily small, because the proportion in Experiment 1 was not large (i.e., .533). Maybe more significantly, among the 399 participants who provided different estimates for the two alternatives and for whom s was higher than the median (Mdn = 0.011), the proportion of participants for whom est N was greater than est 1 was .496, 95% CI = [.447, .546 ]. This is clearly lower than the corresponding proportion in Experiment 1 (i.e., .580, 95% CI = [.528, .629]).
Discussion
The results of this additional study clearly suggest that the evaluative advantage in favor of Alt. N observed in Experiment 1 was induced by adaptive sampling, and not by the mere fact that Alt. N was novel.
General Discussion and Conclusion
Our theoretical and empirical results provide an existence proof that adaptive sampling can lead to an evaluative advantage for the new. As to the moderate size of the effect observed, it should be noted that our setup, with just two "older" alternatives, is a kind of worst-case scenario. Indeed, ancillary simulations with more alternatives (typical of most naturally occurring environments) revealed a stronger novelty advantage. Needless to say, proving that adaptive sampling helps explain the novelty advantage in naturally occurring environments would require collecting and analyzing field data. This is an exciting avenue for future research.
Our results apparently run against the evidence that supports preferences for familiar items, such as the results of studies on mere-exposure effects (e.g., Zajonc, 1968 Zajonc, , 2001 . However, our approach neither contradicts empirical evidence supporting mere-exposure effects nor questions the relevance of these effects. Instead, our results suggest a different mechanism that might play a complementary role in explaining attitudes and preferences in naturally occurring, noisy environments. Although the old benefits from prior exposure, our theory suggests conditions under which information about the value of an old alternative might be subject to a systematic negative bias that, in turn, helps the new. (See Additional Analyses in the Supplemental Material available online for an analysis that incorporates the mere-exposure effect.)
Our findings also seem to run against the ample evidence that supports ambiguity aversion (e.g., Ellsberg, 1961) . After all, our participants knew very little about the payoff distribution of Alt. N (this distribution had been drawn from just once or twice), whereas they had much more information about the payoff distributions of the old alternatives. Ambiguity aversion suggests that they would have avoided the new. Nevertheless, participants came to evaluate the new, ambiguous, alternative more positively than the old. Most of the existing evidence in support of ambiguity aversion has been obtained using a decisionfrom-description paradigm in which participants choose between options whose payoff distributions are described as sets of possible outcomes and associated probabilities. By contrast, our participants had to learn the payoff distributions from their own experiences. Research has found that risk preferences tend to differ between decision-fromexperience settings and decision-from-description settings (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) . Our results tentatively suggest that there might be a similar phenomenon at play regarding preferences for or against ambiguity.
How do our results relate to existing explanations for why people might like new things? As mentioned in the introduction, according to one category of such explanations, the new might be a better fit to people's changing tastes or might solve problems that the old could not. In contrast, our mechanism can apply if tastes are not changing and if new items are not superior to old items. Specifically, in our study, the payoff distribution of Alt. N was the same as the payoff distribution of the comparison, but older, alternative, Alt. 1. Thus, our results potentially call into question the validity of empirical approaches that measure the speed of changing tastes by measuring the turnover rate of the set of most popular items (e.g., the turnover rate of top-40 songs). Our theory suggests that such turnover is possible even if tastes do not change.
The second category of explanations we invoked in the introduction relies on collective dynamics, that is, the process by which local imitation in a social network leads to the diffusion (by chance) of new items. This approach leads to predictions that are contingent on the geometry of the social networks involved (Centola, 2010) : Some networks make diffusion difficult (e.g., fully connected networks), whereas others facilitate diffusion (e.g., smallworld networks). Our theory suggests that the new might become popular even in networks that make diffusion of new practices difficult.
Note that our mechanism can combine with network diffusion dynamics to contribute to the rise and demise of new alternatives. Our theory suggests conditions under which some people may prefer new items; if others in their social network imitate these early adopters, a diffusion process might be triggered, and the new might become chosen by many people. It then enters the consideration sets of those people's network neighbors. Our model predicts that the new then becomes subject to declining evaluations as time passes. Soon enough, the new is subject to an evaluative disadvantage, when it is compared with what is even newer. Our mechanism likely contributes to short-lived preferences regarding, for example, restaurants, cuisine, filmmakers, movie genres, actors, musicians, and book writers.
In conclusion, we want to emphasize that we do not claim that existing explanations for the evaluative advantage of novel items are wrong or do not matter. Rather, our theory offers an additional mechanism that likely plays a role in settings of social significance.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ONLINE MATERIAL: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We start by proving a lemma that claims that in all periods, the distribution of quality estimates for Alt. 1 is not higher than the payoff distribution. Then we show that this lemma implies the result stated in Theorem 1 in the body of the paper.
Our proof builds on a notion of stochastic ordering described by Karlin and Rinott (1980) : the stochastic ordering induced by the total positivity of order 2 relation (denoted by ≻ 2 ). It is defined as follows. Let and ′ be two densities defined on the real line (denoted ℝ). We will say that is larger than ′ according to the ≻ 2 relation (denoted by ≻ 2 ′) if and only if for all , ∈ ℝ, (max( , )) ′(min( , )) ≥ ′( ) ( ).
(See Karlin and Rinott (1980, p.472-473) for a detailed discussion of this relation.)
The common payoff distribution of Alt. 1 and Alt. N is denoted by . For all ≥ 1, let 1, denote the distribution of ̂1 , , the quality estimate of Alt. 1 at the beginning of period t. For all ≥ , let , denote the distribution of ̂, , the quality estimate of Alt. N at the beginning of period t. The payoff distribution of Alt. 2 is known. In other words, the quality estimate for Alt. 2 remains the same all along and thus is irrelevant to the dynamics of the system. We thus need not refer to it in the proofs.
Lemma 2: For all ≥ 1, ≻ 2 1, .
Proof: For all , let Δ ( , ) = (max( , )) 1, (min( , )) − 1, ( ) ( ) Proving the lemma is equivalent to showing that for all ≥ 1 and for all , ∈ ℝ, Δ ( , ) ≥ 0. We use a proof by induction.
Base case: Let = 1. We need to show that for all , ∈ ℝ, Δ 1 ( , ) ≥ 0. Since 1,1 = , we have Δ 1 ( , ) = 0 ≥ 0. DOI: 10.11770956797615615581 S2 Inductive step: Let ≥ 1. Assume that for all , ∈ ℝ, Δ ( , ) ≥ 0. We need to show that for all , ∈ ℝ, Δ +1 ( , ) ≥ 0.
Let us first express 1, +1 ( ). Here, denotes the quality estimate for Alt. 1 at the beginning of period + 1. To make use of the induction hypothesis, we want to express 1, +1 ( ) as a function of the quality estimate in the previous period, ̂1 , .
Suppose that ̂1 , =̂1 , . Two scenarios can happen. Either Alt.1 is not sampled, or it is sampled. Let us start with the case where Alt. 1 is not sampled. The probability that Alt. 1 is not sampled in period is 1 − 1 (̂1 , ). In this case its quality estimate at the beginning of period + 1 is equal to ̂1 , because the quality estimate does not change if there is no sampling. In this case, the new estimate is equal to only if
In what follows, let ̂1 , = be an indicator variable equal to 1 if ̂1 , = and equal to 0 otherwise. Now consider the case where Alt. 1 is sampled. The probability that Alt. 1 is sampled in period is 1 (̂1 , ). In this case, the new quality estimate is the payoff observed in period . Therefore, the probability that the new quality estimate is equal to is ( ).
Combining the two scenarios and summing over possible values for ̂1 , , we obtain:
Multiplying the two sides of the equation by ( ), we get:
( ) 1, +1 ( ) = ( ) 1, ( )(1 − 1 ( )) + ( ) ( ) [ 1 (̂1 , )] DOI: 10.11770956797615615581
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Similarly, (max( , )) 1, +1 (min( , )) = (max( , )) 1, (min( , ))(1 − 1 (min( , ))) + (max( , )) (min( , )) [ 1 (̂1 , )] = (max( , )) 1, (min( , ))(1 − 1 (min( , ))) + ( ) ( ) [ 1 (̂1 , )].
The last equality follows from the fact that (max( , )) (min( , ))= ( ) ( ).
Then, by taking the difference, we have: Δ +1 ( , ) = (max( , )) 1, (min( , ))(1 − 1 (min( , ))) − ( ) 1, ( )(1 − 1 ( )).
By application of the induction hypothesis, we have (max( , )) 1, (min( , )) ≥ ( ) 1, ( ).
Therefore, Δ +1 ( , ) ≥ (y) 1, (x)(1 − 1 (min( , ))) − (y) 1, (x)(1 − 1 ( )) = (y) 1, (x)( 1 ( ) − 1 (min( , ))).
We assumed that 1 (•) was non-decreasing. This implies, that 1 ( ) − 1 (min( , )) ≥ 0. From this and the above equation, we have Δ +1 ( , ) ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of the inductive step.
We have proven the base case and the inductive step. The principle of mathematical induction implies that, for all ≥ 1 and for all , ∈ ℝ, Δ ( , ) ≥ 0. That is, for all ≥ 1, ≻ 2 1, . QED.
We assumed that the initial quality estimate for Alt. N was a random draw of the payoff distribution f DOI: 10.11770956797615615581 S4 common to Alt. 1 and Alt. N. In other words, , = . This and Lemma 2 thus imply the following corollary:
Corollary 3: We have: , ≻ 2 1, .
This result implies that ̂1 , is lower than ̂, per the usual stochastic order. This is formalized as follows:
Proof: We use Theorem 2.2 in Karlin and Rinott (1980, p. 477) . This theorem is formulated as follows:
Let and ′ be two densities defined on the real line (denoted ℝ) such that ≻ 2 ′. Then for any bounded and increasing function ,
Corollary 3 and this theorem imply that for any bounded and increasing function ,
This is a standard characterization of the usual stochastic order and thus implies that for all ∈ ℝ,
We are now ready to conclude the proof of Theorem 1. Let ≥ 1. We have: In all online sessions, the task discussed in the paper was the first of a series of 2 or 3 short experimental tasks. In a typical session, participants worked for about 5 minutes. They spent on average about 1 minute and 13s to make the 11 choices and enter their quality estimates at the end of the choice sequence.
Ensuring data quality
We removed the data of 4 participants who missed a choice (probably because of letting more than the maximum of 90s elapse before making a choice). We also removed the data of 65 participants whose final quality estimates were outside of the range of observed payoffs (0 to 130). We believe that these responses signal that the participants did not pay adequate attention to the observed payoffs. 
Game Instructions
Your goal is to collect as many points as possible by making a series of choices between two or more buttons. At the end of the game, the points you accumulated will be converted to US dollars at a rate of 10000 points = 1 USD. Behind each button, there is a large stack of chips with values marked on them.
Some buttons can be BETTER than others: DOI: 10.11770956797615615581
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-BETTER buttons cover stacks of chips with HIGH values.
-WORSE buttons cover stacks of chips with LOW values.
On every round, you have to select one button by clicking on it with the mouse. A chip is randomly picked from the stack behind the button. The button you selected becomes ORANGE and a number is DISPLAYED on the button: This is the VALUE of the chip that was picked from the stack. (if the number you see is X, you will collect X points; if X is negative, you give back X points). After you collect the points from your chip, the chip is put back in the stack from which you took it and you move to the next round.
You start with an initial endowment of 500 points. There are about 11 rounds. The values you see on the buttons BEFORE STARTING are the values of ONE randomly picked chip from the corresponding stack.
Please note that you have up to 90 seconds to make each choice.
Instructions for eliciting the quality estimates
For each button, please indicate the number of points you expect to obtain if you were to select it one more time. If your answer does not make sense given what you have seen, your HIT might be rejected.
For example, if the numbers you have seen are in the hundreds, but you respond in the thousands, your hit will likely be rejected.
EXPERIMENT 2
In all sessions, the task was the only one in the experiment. In a typical session, participants worked for about 5 minutes.
Experiment Sample Size
We decided to collect as many observations as for Experiment 1, and we used the same exclusion criteria for the participants. The data was collected over several online and we stopped collection of data for the DOI: 10.11770956797615615581 S3 study at the end of the session the number of participants was at least as high as the number of participants in Study 1.
Ensuring data quality
To ensure statistical power similar to that we had in the previous experiment, we ran the new experiment with a similar number of participants. We collected data from 896 participants. We removed the data of 1 participant who missed some choices (probably because of letting more than the maximum of 90s elapse before making a choice). We also removed the data of 90 participants whose final quality estimates were outside of the range of observed payoffs (0 to 130).
Game Instructions
The instructions were the same as in the main experiment, with the exception of one additional sentence:
"On every round, you will also see the value the chip you would have got if you had chosen one of the other buttons."
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ADDITIONAL SIMULATIONS -MERE EXPOSURE EFFECT
It is straightforward to adapt our simulations to a setting where there is a positive effect of exposure on evaluations. Assume, for example, that the true qualities of the alternatives increase by 2 every period since introduction. 1 Simulations with s=0.021, b=0.74 and =11 show that at the end of 11 periods, the likelihood Alt. N is evaluated more positively than Alt. 1 is 0.42. When there is no adaptive sampling (i.e. the available alternatives have equal sampling probabilities), this likelihood is 0.33. In this case as well, adaptive sampling has a positive effect on relative evaluations of the new as compared to the old. A natural follow-up to this project would explore empirically how the two mechanisms -mere exposure and adaptive sampling -jointly affect evaluative judgments.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA -EXPERIMENT 1
To evaluate the contribution of information sampling to the asymmetry in quality estimates, we complement the recency-weighted analysis presented in the body of the paper by two additional analyses.
Last sampled payoff
Let denote the last observation for Alt. 1 and denote the last observation for Alt. N. Adaptive sampling implies that the last observations of the alternatives will tend to favor Alt. N rather then Alt. 1.
1 The payoff distribution of Alt. 1 and N is Uniform(2*(t-1),2*(t-1)+130) and the payoff distribution of Alt. 2 is Uniform(2*(t-)+62, 2*(t-)+68).
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We find that this is the case (see Table 1 ): the last observation for N is higher than the last observation for Alt.1 in 58% of the cases. Besides, the last observation for Alt. 1 is frequently below the mean of the payoff distribution (in 66% of the cases). This underestimation tendency is stronger than that for Alt. N (underestimation in 55% of the cases).
Average sampled payoff
It is also possible to characterize the asymmetry in terms of the average sampled payoff for each alternative. Let denote the average observation for Alt. 1and denote the average observation for Alt. N. The average sampled payoff for Alt. 1 tends to be lower than the average sampled payoff for Alt. N (in 53% of the cases). ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA -EXPERIMENT 2
Choice Behavior
In Experiment 1, choice and sampling amounted to the same thing: participants would only sample an alternative if they chose it. In Experiment 2, sampling and choice are different.
Because participants observe the payoffs of all the alternatives in every period (even they alternatives they do not choose), they sample all alternatives in every period. But they choose just one of them. To analyze the behavior of the participants, we adapted our model to reflect this distinction. In this updated model, we predict choices in every period using a logistic choice rule, just as before. Quality estimates for all three alternatives are updated in each period, since the participant sample information about all three alternatives irrespective of their choices.
With this adapted model, the best fitting values for parameters s and b are: s=0.008, 95% CI [0.006,0.009], and b=0.57, 95% CI [0.42,0.71]. These parameter estimates suggest that participants engaged in adaptive choice behavior: they were more likely to choose again alternatives for which they observed higher payoffs.
Final Quality Estimate: Based on Information Sampled by the Participants
We computed what would have been the participants' quality estimates, had they integrated the information they actually sampled according to the delta rule (as in the analysis of Experiment 1). We used the estimated parameter value of b=0.57. Let and denote the final quality estimates implied by this estimate-updating model. The proportion of participants for whom is 0.491, 95% CI [0.456,0.525]. In this case, there is therefore no asymmetry in terms of sampled information,
